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THE USE AND ABUSE OF TRUST: SOCIAL CAPITAL 







Guilds are social scientists’ favoured historical example of institutions generating a ‘social 
capital’ of trust that benefited entire economies. This article considers this view in the light of 
empirical findings for early modern Europe. It draws the distinction between a ‘particularized’ 
trust in persons of known attributes and a ‘generalized’ trust that applies even to strangers. 
This is paralleled by the distinction between a ‘differential’ trust in institutions that enforce 
the rights of certain groups and a ‘uniform’ trust in impartial institutions that enforce the 
rights of all. Guilds had the potential to generate the particularized and differential trust to 
solve market failures relating to product quality, training, and innovation, although the 
empirical findings suggest that they often failed to fulfil this potential. Guilds also had the 
potential to abuse their trust, and the empirical findings show that they indeed manipulated 
their social capital of shared norms, common information, mutual sanctions, and collective 
political action to benefit their members at others’ expense, blocking the spread of generalized 
and uniform trust. Counter to the assumptions of social capital theory, the example of pre-
industrial guilds suggests that the particularized and differential trust fostered by associative 
institutions do not favour but hinder the generalized and uniform trust fostered by impartial 
institutions. 
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   1 
The Use and Abuse of Trust: 
Social Capital and its Deployment by Early Modern Guilds 
 
1. Trust, Social Capital, and History 
 
The concepts of ‘trust’ and ‘social capital’ have enjoyed increasing vogue now for more than 
a decade. History has been mobilized to support them in various ways. Past societies are often 
portrayed as having enjoyed more trust than modern ones. History is mined for examples of 
the closely-knit and multi-stranded social networks thought to generate particularly rich 
stocks of social capital.
1 Those modern societies that retain more vestiges of associative 
networks from their past are regarded as better off than those that depend exclusively on 
markets and states.
 2 Certain cultures are supposed to have evolved historically so as to foster 
networks and trust.
3 Yet while many studies adduce historical examples of social networks in 
passing, few examine them rigorously, to identify which of their features generated trust, how 
they deployed their social capital, and what effect this had on their economies. This article 
seeks to fill this gap, by examining a historical social network frequently adduced as 
generating trust and social capital: the guild. 
 
1.1. What is Social Capital? 
 
Despite their rapid diaspora (or perhaps because of it), the concepts of ‘social capital’ and 
‘trust’ have fallen prey to a horde of competing definitions.
4 To be clear about the object of 
discussion, this article adopts the following definition of ‘social capital’, which is consistent 
with classic discussions by James Coleman and Robert Putnam.
5 ‘Social capital’ is a store of 
value generated when a group of individuals invests resources in fostering a body of 
relationships with each other (a ‘social network’), which generates benefits in later periods.
6 
                                                   
1 J. S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, in: American Journal of Sociology, 94, 1989, 
Supplement, pp. S95-S120, here pp. S117-S119; R. D. Putnam / R.. Leonardi / R. Y. Nanetti , Making Democracy 
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ 1993, esp. pp. 163-85; F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social 
Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York 1995, esp. pp. 1-57, 345-53; R. D. Putnam , Bowling Alone: the 
Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York 2000, pp. 319, 322-3, 325, 346-7. 
2 K. J. Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in: P. Dasgupta / I. Serageldin (eds.), Social Capital: A 
Multifaceted Perspective, Washington, 2000, pp. 3-5, here p. 5; Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work, pp. 121, 
162. 
3 Fukuyama, Trust, pp. 1-57, 345-53. 
4 Arrow, Observations; R. M. Solow, Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance, in: Dasgupta / 
Serageldin, Social Capital, pp. 6-12. 
5 Coleman, Social Capital; Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work. 
6 Scepticism has been expressed about the analogy with capital as it is ordinarily conceived by economists: see 
Arrow, Observations, p. 4; Solow, Some Notes, pp. 7-8.   2 
The resources invested in social capital reside in relationships within a network rather than in 
physical objects, financial instruments, or (as with human capital) single individuals.
7  
  The returns to social capital are many, in this view, but all fall into one of four 
categories.
8 First, social networks foster shared norms, creating expectations of 
trustworthiness which reduce the transactions costs associated with violation of agreements.
9 
Second, social networks improve information flow, creating the trust necessary to solve 
market failures caused by incomplete or asymmetric information.
10 Third, social networks 
create the trust that facilitates group sanctions against deviations from the network’s norms.
11 
Fourth, social networks create the trust that overcomes obstacles to collective political action 
to monitor government.
12 Social capital is held to be created when social networks create the 
trust necessary for correcting failures of markets and states, and this investment pays off in 
terms of better contract enforcement, information, sanctions, and collective action. The total 
cost of the investment in social capital, it is claimed, is exceeded by the total benefit flowing 
from these four sources.
13 
  According to this view, all four forms of value associated with social capital – norm 
fostering, information flow, penalties on deviance, and collective action – have strong ‘public 
good’ characteristics: individual investors in social networks enjoy only part of the benefits, 
so they may under-invest.
14 This has policy implications: to the extent that social capital 
exists and is a public good, there is a case for public action to create, subsidize, or privilege 
social networks, whether to substitute for states or markets or to make them work better.
15 
Increasingly, investing in social capital and social networks – rather than, for instance, 
effective states and efficient markets – is being recommended as a solution to problems of 
social exclusion and regional disparities in the rich West,
16 economic transition in post-
                                                   
7 Coleman, Social Capital, pp. S97-S101. 
8 Coleman, Social Capital, pp. S100-S101. 
9 Coleman, Social Capital; D. Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in: D. Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations, Oxford 1988, pp. 213-37. 
10 Coleman, Social Capital, pp. S101-S102. 
11 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work; Coleman, Social Capital; D. Narayan / L. Pritchett, Social Capital: 
Evidence and Implications, in: Dasgupta / Serageldin, Social Capital, pp. 269-95. 
12 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work; Coleman, Social Capital; Narayan / Pritchett, Social Capital. 
13 The social capital literature generally avoids discussing what these costs must be, but at the least they must 
include the opportunity cost of the time and other resources devoted to fostering interpersonal relationships within 
social networks, and in principle they should also include any negative externalities resulting from actions taken by 
the network. For exceptional contributions that consider the costs as well as the benefits of social capital and trust, 
see P. Dasgupta, Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital, in: Dasgupta / Serageldin, Social Capital, pp. 
325-424, here e.g. pp. 327, 344-7, 367; and P. Dasgupta, Social Capital and Economic Progress: Analytics, in: E. 
Ostrom / T. K. Ahn (eds.), Social Capital: a Reader, Cheltenham 2003, here esp. p. 310. 
14 Coleman, Social Capital, pp. S115-S119; P. Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in: Gambetta, Trust, pp. 49-72, 
here 64. 
15 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1993, Oxford / New York 1993, p. 8; 
World Bank, The World Bank and Participation, Washington, 1994, p. i; E. A. Brett, The Participatory Principle in 
Development Projects: the Costs and Benefits of Cooperation, in: Public Administration and Development, 16, 
1996, pp. 5-19, here esp. pp. 5-6. 
16 Coleman, Social Capital; Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work.   3 
communist Eastern Europe,
17 and development challenges in the Third World.
18 These policy 
implications mean it is important to look closely at the institutions that create social capital.  
  What kind of institution fosters social capital? James Coleman, one of the earliest 
theorists focussing on this question, postulated that the unusual degree of trust associated with 
‘interesting’ social capital – the sort yielding the four pay-offs cited above – is likely to be 
generated by social arrangements possessing two key features: ‘closure’ and ‘multiplex 
relationships’. ‘Closure’ means that network membership is clearly defined, so that members’ 
actions can be easily monitored, norm-violating behaviour effectively punished, and norm-
compliant behaviour collectively rewarded. ‘Multiplex relationships’ mean that an 
organization, ‘once brought into existence for one set of purposes, can also aid others’. Many 
social networks (especially those such as guilds, with long historical roots) are not 
deliberately ‘brought into existence for one set of purposes’, but members of the network do 
engage in repeated transactions with one another, which generally encompass different 
spheres of activity such as the economic, social, political, and religious. This generates multi-
stranded relationships which endow members with multiple means of getting information 
about, punishing deviance in, and urging collective action on one another.
19 Coleman’s 
insights are significant, yet in the spate of publications on social capital and social networks 
since 1989 they have hardly been pursued.
20 As this essay will argue, however, European 
economic history suggests that ‘closure’ and ‘multiplex relationships’ are essential for 
generating social capital and crucial to its broader impact. 
 
1.2. What is Trust? 
 
But what is this ‘trust’ that is so closely associated with the concept of ‘social capital’? To be 
clear about what we are discussing, this essay will adopt the straightforward, ordinary-
language definition of trust as ‘confidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a 
person or thing’.
21 Social scientists are interested in this confidence or reliance in persons and 
things because there are strong reasons for believing that without it, economic agents will 
refrain from engaging in transactions involving certain people, things, or institutions, and 
                                                   
17 M. Raiser, Informal Institutions, Social Capital and Economic Transition, in: G. A. Cornia and V. Popov (eds.), 
Transition and Institutions. The Experience of Gradual and Late Reformers, Oxford 2001, pp. 218-39; J. Stiglitz, 
New Bridges across the Chasm: Institutional Strategies for the Transition Economies (World Bank, 8 Dec. 1999). 
http://wbln0018. worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/0/0ac8adc7b03aca0885256847004e2b82? OpenDocument 
18 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1993, esp. p. 8; World Bank, The World 
Bank and Participation, esp.p. i; Dasgupta / Serageldin, Social Capital. 
19 Coleman, Social Capital, pp. S104-S110. 
20 For an excellent recent exception, see N. Molenaers, Associations or Informal Networks? Social Capital and 
Local Development Practices, in: M. Hooghe / D. Stolle (eds.), Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and 
Institutions in Comparative Perspective, New York 2003, pp. 113-132, here esp. p. 122. 
21 Compact Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford 1991, p. 2122, panel 623.   4 
mutually beneficial cooperation will go unrealized.
22 However, this ordinary-language 
definition of trust only takes us so far.  
  For one thing, it is ambiguous as to whether ‘trust’ refers to an inward sentiment or an 
observable propensity. The sentiment of trust is a feeling or attitude adopted by an economic 
agent: it is not directly observable by the social scientist, and is at most an input into actions 
which have outcomes for the economy. Trust as a propensity, by contrast, is just the increased 
tendency to engage in certain actions: it is observable and it directly gives rise to economic 
outcomes. Contributors to the literature on social capital often talk in terms of trust as a 
sentiment, seeking to measure people’s feelings of trust and analysing the influences on these 
feelings.
23 However, since it is not inputs but outcomes that have social benefits, what social 
capital theorists are really interested in is trust as an observable propensity to engage in 
certain actions or enter into certain types of transaction.
24 Such a propensity may or may not 
derive from an inward sentiment of trust. It may often derive from a perception that certain 
social arrangements tend to lead one’s transaction partners to behave in a trustworthy way 
even if, in the absence of these social arrangements, one would not feel a sentiment of trust 
towards them. Economic historians investigating social capital are primarily interested in 
outcomes – and also prefer to focus on what is observable – so this essay will concentrate on 
trust as a propensity rather than as a sentiment. 
  But even when it is regarded as an observable propensity, the concept of trust is still 
used in several different ways by social scientists. Before we proceed, we will have to 
minimize this confusion by making a few important distinctions. First, there are two broad 
categories of what may be an object of trust: persons and institutions. A propensity to trust in 
persons is a tendency, for whatever reason, to be willing to enter into transactions with 
partners having certain personal or group attributes. A propensity to trust in institutions, by 
contrast, is the tendency to make use of particular mechanisms – guilds, markets, states, 
communities, churches, manorial systems, masonic lodges, religious clubs, mafias, cartels, or 
any one of the myriad of mechanisms available in one’s society to mediate human 
relationships. Much of the literature on social capital fails to distinguish between these two 
manifestations of trust, even though they have quite different policy implications. The social 
capital literature often assumes, for example, that encouraging trust in persons will give rise 
to greater trust in institutions, which in turn is invariably regarded as an unambiguously 
                                                   
22 See the discussion of the social and economic significance of trust in Dasgupta, Trust, pp. 49-51, 55, 61; 
Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, pp. 217-20. 
23 See, for instance, Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, p. 217; Putnam , Bowling Alone, pp. 134-47. For a criticism 
of this tendency in the literature on trust and social capital, particularly in the work of Robert Putnam , see Stolle / 
Hooghe, Conclusion, in: Hooghe / Stolle (eds.), Generating Social Capital, pp. 231-48, here esp. p. 244. 
24 For a clear-sighted discussion focussing on the observable, economically relevant aspect of trust (i.e., what we 
are terming trust as a propensity), see Dasgupta, Trust, esp. pp. 49-51; and P. Seabright, Is Cooperation Habit-
Forming?, in: P. Dasgupta / K.-G. Mäler (eds.), The Environment and Emerging Development Issues, 2 vols., 
Oxford 1997, vol. 2, pp. 283-307.   5 
desirable outcome. Yet the process by which trust in persons translates into trust in 
institutions is never spelled out. Even more worryingly, it is easy to imagine both persons 
(charismatic dictators, religious zealots, promoters of pyramid schemes) and institutions 
(mafias, cartels, racist clubs) that attract trust but do not benefit society. 
  Even before addressing such causal and normative questions, there is a further 
distinction to be drawn between two very different kinds of trust in persons – a particularized 
trust in persons of known attributes or affiliations, and a generalized trust that applies even to 
complete strangers. Particularized trust depends on specific personal attributes or group 
affiliations of your transaction partner: you are willing to enter into a transaction because you 
either know your transaction partner personally or she is a member of a group whose other 
members you trust as a result of knowing their personal attributes.
25 Generalized trust, by 
contrast, is a propensity to enter into transactions with all persons on an equal footing, even 
with strangers – people of whose personal characteristics or group affiliations you are 
ignorant. It is this generalized trust in strangers which social scientists find particularly 
interesting, since it is thought to have very wide social and economic benefits.
26 But the social 
capital literature, while paying lip service to generalized trust as a desired outcome, actually 
spends most of its time discussing particularized trust in persons of known attributes and 
affiliations, and simply assumes that this somehow leads to higher levels of generalized 
trust.
27 One purpose of this essay, therefore, is to examine the relationship between a 
particularized and a generalized trust in persons. 
  But we must also distinguish between two very different kinds of trust in institutions 
– a differential trust of institutions with ‘closure’ (institutions mainly trusted by their 
members), and a uniform trust of institutions whose provisions apply uniformly to anyone in a 
given society. Differential trust is a propensity to allow your transactions to be mediated by a 
particular institution because it can be trusted to enforce your particular rights and privileges. 
Thus, for instance, an early modern craftsman might have had a propensity to allow his 
transactions to be mediated by his guild because he trusted it to enforce his particular rights 
and entitlements as a guild member. Uniform trust, by contrast, is a propensity to allow your 
transactions to be mediated by an institution because it can be trusted to enforce anyone’s 
rights and privileges in an impartial way, regardless of personal attributes. Thus, for instance, 
an efficient market or a just state is supposed to mediate the transactions of any economic 
agent impartially, without regard to any personal characteristic appertaining to the individual 
                                                   
25 For a description of this kind of trust in the context of the Italian mafia, see D. Gambetta, Mafia: the Price of 
Distrust, in: Gambetta, Trust, pp. 159-75, here pp. 165-6. 
26 For a synoptic view of the origins and economic implications of generalized trust in strangers, see P. Seabright, 
The Company of Strangers: a Natural History of Economic Life, Princeton 2004. On the centrality of generalized 
trust to the social capital literature, see Stolle / Hooghe, Conclusion, pp. 232-3. 
27 For cogent criticisms of this gap in social capital theory, see Stolle / Hooghe, Conclusion, pp. 236-7.   6 
(such as gender, ethnicity, religion, or occupation) rather than the transaction in question 
(property rights, legality, etc.).  
  It is this uniform trust in institutions as being impartial, fair, and accessible to all 
members of society which the social capital literature emphasizes as a desirable, long-term 
outcome. But the immediate priorities of the social capital literature are clubs, associations, 
guilds, communities – institutions that generate a differential trust, a perception that they are 
specifically accessible to certain groups (their members), generating a propensity among their 
members to allow transactions to be mediated by these institutions because they can be 
trusted to enforce members’ particular rights and privileges. The tacit assumption in much of 
this literature seems to be that encouraging a differential trust in group-specific institutions 
such as associations will somehow translate into a higher degree of uniform trust in impartial 
institutions such as markets and governments.
28 A second purpose of this essay, therefore, is 
to examine the relationship between a differential and a uniform trust in institutions. 
  Trust among persons and trust in institutions are interconnected: if you do not trust an 
institution to enforce contracts you will not trust persons to fulfil their agreements and hence 
will avoid transacting with them; if you do not trust the persons active in a particular 
institution (traders in a certain market, judges in a certain law-court, masters in a certain 
guild) you will avoid transacting via that institution and may refrain from transacting at all.
29 
As will emerge from the empirical findings for pre-industrial Europe, the closely-knit 
associative networks emphasised in the social capital literature foster a particularized trust in 
people and a differential trust in institutions. Members of particular guilds and communities 
were trusted and one was willing to transact with them because of the personal attributes 
associated with membership in these groups. Guilds and communities themselves were 
trusted to the extent that they were known to be accessible to individuals with one’s own 
attributes and to enforce the specific rights and privileges associated with those attributes. 
Generalized trust in strangers and uniform trust in institutions, by contrast, appear to be 
associated with the emergence of impersonal markets and impartial states – often at the 
expense of special privileges enjoyed by particular groups. A generalized trust in hitherto 
unknown transaction partners was manifested when one knew that one’s transactions with 
them would be mediated by an impartial institutional framework that enforced property rights 
and legal contracts regardless of attributes of the contracting parties. Knowledge of the 
personal characteristics or group affiliations of transaction partners was unnecessary because 
one could have confidence that impersonal, efficient and transparent markets were conveying 
                                                   
28 For evidence on modern economies questioning whether social capital goes beyond fostering a differential trust 
in associative institutions to generating a uniform trust in impartial state institutions, see Stolle / Hooghe, 
Conclusion, pp. 236-40. 
29 On this, see Dasgupta, Trust, p. 50.   7 
reliable information and that where that information was faulty and a contract was violated, 
an impartial legal system would punish the offending party.  
  This discussion has introduced two pairs of concepts that run in parallel: 
particularized versus generalized trust in persons, and differential versus uniform trust in 
institutions. The unspoken assumption of the social capital literature is that the first item in 
each of these pairs is always complementary with the second. A particularized trust in people 
who are members of your network brings about a generalized trust in people you do not 
know, and this makes states and markets work better. A differential trust in institutions (e.g., 
associations) which enforce your specific rights and transactions somehow gives rise to a 
uniform trust in governmental and market institutions which will enforce anyone’s rights and 
transactions. Empirical findings for early modern Europe suggest not only that this hypothesis 
is false, but that its reverse may be true: rather than complements, differential and uniform 
trust are often substitutes. A final purpose of this essay, therefore, is to explore how 
economies moved from particularized and differential to generalized and uniform trust, and 
what role was played in this process by the social capital of trust generated by guilds. 
 
2. Guilds and Social Capital 
 
The guild is unquestionably the most important historical institution referred to by political 
scientists, economists, and policy-makers as an example of ‘social capital’ and ‘trust’ in 
action. Thus, for instance, the influential political scientist and policy advisor Robert Putnam 
has identified the social capital created by northern Italy’s guild tradition as a major 
determinant of its modern economic success, and argued that lack of this guild tradition 
condemned the Italian south to centuries of economic and political stagnation.
30 The 
development economist Pranab Bardhan has contended that guilds benefited economic 
growth historically and has urged more studies of how social capital can benefit growth in 
modern developing economies.
31 In a 1999 speech to the World Bank, its Chief Economist 
Joseph Stiglitz listed ‘guilds’ among those institutions which, by generating social capital, 
could ‘support entrepreneurial efforts’ in modern transition economies.
32 
  Guilds were widespread in Europe from the medieval period to – in some societies – 
the nineteenth century, and debate still rages about why they existed and the economic impact 
they exerted. The English-language historiography tends to regard guilds as important only in 
the medieval period, in the urban economy, and in traditional crafts. This is probably because 
                                                   
30 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work, pp. 163-85; Putnam , Bowling Alone, pp. 319, 322-3, 325, 346-8. 
31 P. Bardhan, The Nature of Institutional Impediments to Economic Development, Center for International and 
Development Economics Research Paper C96-066 (March 3, 1996). http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cider/C96-
066, here pp. 6-7.   8 
in the exceptional economies of England and the Low Countries guilds remained restricted to 
urban crafts, did not spread to export-oriented proto-industries, and from the sixteenth century 
on were generally weakened and circumvented even in towns, often facing a stark choice 
between extinction and transformation into much looser and more flexible associations which 
ultimately came to serve mainly social and cultural purposes.
33 But in most European 
economies, as recent research has shown, strong guilds survived long past the medieval 
period and new ones were formed in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and even nineteenth 
centuries.
34 Even in the Low Countries, where guild decline began first, institutional 
development bifurcated after about 1700, with a continuing decline of guilds in the Southern 
Netherlands but a resurgence in the United Provinces.
35 In other regions of Europe, guilds 
expanded outside the urban craft economy and established themselves in merchant trading 
and export-oriented proto-industries.
36 In many central and southern European societies – 
including Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Bohemia, Italy, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia 
– rural or ‘regional’ (rural-urban) guilds were established throughout the early modern 
period.
37 Guilds’ long survival does not mean they were efficient or beneficial, but it does 
                                                                                                                                                  
32 On the relevance of guilds and social capital to modern transition economies, see Stiglitz, New Bridges; Raiser, 
Informal Institutions, here p. 231. 
33 On the Low Countries, see P. Stabel, Guilds in Late Medieval Flanders: Myths and Realities of Guild Life in an 
Export-Oriented Environment, in: Journal of Medieval History, 30 (2004), pp. 187-212, here p. 194; J. Mokyr, The 
Industrial Revolution and the Netherlands: Why Did It Not Happen?, paper presented to the 150th Anniversary 
Conference Organized by the Royal Dutch Economic Association, 10-11 Dec. 1999, pp. 10-12. On the weakening 
even of the most powerful guilds in England, the London livery companies, from the sixteenth century on, see J. R. 
Kellett, The Breakdown of Guild and Corporation Control of the Handicraft and Retail Trades in London, in: 
Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 10, 1958), pp. 381-94; and the essays in I. A. Gadd / P. Wallis (eds.), Guilds, 
Society, and Economy in London, 1450-1800, London 2002. For a comparative discussion in the context of proto-
industries, see S. Ogilvie, State Corporatism and Proto-Industry: the Württemberg Black Forest, 1580-1797, 
Cambridge 1997, pp. 412-37. 
34 See the evidence in J. Ehmer, Traditionelles Denken und neue Fragestellungen zur Geschichte von Handwerk 
und Zunft, in: F. Lenger (ed.), Handwerk, Hausindustrie und die Historische Schule der Nationalökonomie. 
Wissenschafts- und gewerbegeschichtliche Perspektiven, Bielefeld 1998, pp. 19-77, here pp. 36-7, 54; Ogilvie, 
State Corporatism, pp. 72-9, 419-37; U. Pfister, Craft Guilds and Proto-Industrialization in Europe, 16th to 18th 
Centuries, in: S. R. Epstein / H. G. Haupt / C. Poni / H. Soly (eds.), Guilds, Economy and Society, Sevilla 1998, 
pp. 11-24, here 11-14; and W. Reininghaus, Gewerbe in der frühen Neuzeit, Munich 1990, pp. 61-3, 71-2, 79-80. 
35 On this bifurcation, see Mokyr, Industrial Revolution, pp. 10-12. On the resurgence of guild power in the United 
Provinces, see S. Bos / P. Lourens / J. Lucassen, Die Zünfte in der niederländischen Republik, in: H.-G. Haupt 
(ed.), Das Ende der Zünfte. Ein europäischer Vergleich, Göttingen 2002, pp. 127-53, here pp. 128-9; Jan de Vries / 
A. M. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 
1500–1815, Cambridge 1997, pp. 162-3, 293-4, 340-1, 581-3; U. Pfister, ‘The Craft Guild as a Firm’ or ‘Guilds 
and Proto-Industrialization in Europe, 16th to 18th Centuries’, paper delivered at the conference ‘Guilds and Non-
Industrial Worlds, Utrecht University, 21-22 January 2000, here pp. 12-13; Jan L. van Zanden, The Rise and 
Decline of Holland’s Economy: Merchant Capitalism and the Labour Market, Manchester, 1993, pp. 127-40. On 
the restriction of guilds in the Southern Netherlands almost exclusively to urban agglomerations, see C. Lis / H. 
Soly, Die Zünfte in den österreichischen Niederlanden, in: Haupt, Ende der Zünfte, pp. 155-80, here p. 157; these 
authors nevertheless differ from Mokyr in arguing (e.g. on pp. 155-6) that Flemish guilds retained economic 
importance into the eighteenth century. 
36 S. Ogilvie, Social Institutions and Proto-Industrialization, in: S. Ogilvie / M. Cerman (eds.), European Proto-
Industrialization, Cambridge 1996, pp. 23-37, here pp. 30-3; Ogilvie, State Corporatism, pp. 419-31; Pfister, Craft 
Guilds, pp. 11-14; Pfister, The Craft Guild as a Firm, p. 1.  
37 See the studies surveyed in Ehmer, Traditionelles Denken, pp. 36-7; Ogilvie, Social Institutions, pp. 30-3; 
Ogilvie, State Corporatism, pp. 428-31; Pfister, The Craft Guild as a Firm, pp. 5-7.   9 
render them an important object of research for understanding European economic 
development.
38 
  Do guilds actually qualify as social networks that fostered trust along the lines laid 
out by modern social capital theorists? As already mentioned, James Coleman, the originator 
of the concept of social capital, defined two criteria that social networks must possess in order 
to generate social capital: ‘closure’ and ‘multiplex relationships’.
39 Guilds throughout early 
modern Europe certainly manifested closure through their screening of admission to 
apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership, and their whole or partial exclusion of 
women, Jews, foreigners, bastards, those whose parents pursued ‘defiling’ occupations, and 
members of many other identifiable groups.
40 Early modern guilds also clearly manifested 
‘multiplex’ relationships. Guild members typically transacted in the same factor and product 
markets, socialized at their regular taverns, collaborated on political action, and attended each 
other’s weddings and funerals.
41 Guilds thus displayed to a particularly striking degree the 
characteristics of closure and multiplex relationships identified by modern theorists as 
essential for a network to generate significant social capital. 
  Early modern guilds can also be observed generating all four main manifestations of 
social capital – shared norms, information flow, punishment of deviants, and political action. 
Charters, petitions, account-books, and court conflicts are replete with shared norms which 
guilds explicitly formulated to govern their members’ economic, social, and cultural 
activities.
42 Guilds appointed officials, inspectors, professional informers, and free-lance spies 
to inspect workshops, and they held regular assemblies where members were expected to 
report information relevant to guild interests.
43 Group sanctions were achieved through 
guilds’ entitlement to punish – either autonomously or through communal or princely courts – 
a vast array of offences, many not explicitly legislated but simply devised at the discretion of 
local guild officials; guild gossip, rumour and defamation also exerted informal – but often 
                                                   
38 For a detailed discussion of why a widespread and long-lived institution such as the guild cannot (counter to the 
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effective – pressure on those who violated group norms.
44 Collective political action was 
central to most early modern guilds, whose records reveal remarkable expenditures of time 
and money on lobbying urban and princely councils, bribing officials, and organizing 
marches, strikes and demonstrations to put pressure on the political decision-making 
process.
45 
  It is not surprising, therefore, that the guild has been identified by modern theorists as 
the prime historical example of social capital in action. Guilds displayed the characteristics of 
closure and multiplex relationships which theorists argue are important for a network to 
generate social capital. And guilds can be observed creating social capital in its four main 
forms – norms, information, punishment, and collective action. Examining early modern 
guilds thus has important implications for how we think about social capital and trust more 
generally. 
 
3. Guilds and the Use of Trust 
 
There are three main ways in which guilds are supposed to have used their social capital of 
trust to benefit the early modern economy. First, guilds are regarded as having generated the 
trust necessary to solve asymmetries of information between producers, merchants, and 
consumers concerning product quality, thereby increasing the volume of exchange and 
enabling industries to expand over larger spatial areas.
46 Second, guilds are held to have 
overcome problems of trust in markets for trained labour, thereby increasing the volume of 
exchange and improving industrial productivity.
47 Third, guilds are viewed as having created 
the trust to solve imperfections in markets for technological innovations, creating incentives 
for innovators to devise new ideas and disseminate their innovations widely.
48 Examining 
each of these arguments more closely can tell us something about the strengths and 
weaknesses of trust in encouraging economic development. 
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3.1. Guilds, Trust and Quality 
 
The first way in which guilds are supposed to have used their social capital to benefit the 
economy was by creating trust about product quality. In the pre-industrial economy, it is 
argued, information asymmetries between producers and consumers were very high – much 
higher than in modern economies. Lack of trust among consumers and merchants toward 
producers of craft wares is supposed to have been so great that it significantly reduced their 
willingness to make purchases. This in turn harmed the economy by diminishing the overall 
volume of exchange and reducing gains from trade.
49 
  Guilds, it is claimed, created the trust to overcome this market failure. They did so by 
regulating raw materials, production processes, apprenticeship, journeymanship, mastership 
examinations, trademarks, and output quality, and (in dispersed rural proto-industries) by 
contracting collectively with merchants.
50 That is, guilds enforced rules which created a 
‘particularized’ trust in guild members, giving consumers and merchants the confidence to 
enter into transactions with them. On the face of it, this seems a perfect example of social 
capital theory, whereby a particularized trust in persons of known attributes (guild masters) 
and a differential trust in an institution which enforced particular producers’ privileges (the 
guild) solved a market failure, thereby encouraging uniform trust in another institution (the 
market) and even gradually fostering a generalized trust in strangers. 
  But is this really what guilds did? When we look more closely, some cracks begin to 
appear in this optimistic analysis. A first problem relates to the evidence usually adduced in 
its support, which is mainly literary or legal. To establish that guild-specific trust was 
economically necessary – i.e., that there really was a serious failure in markets for product 
quality – enthusiasts for guilds point out frequent references to poor craftsmanship in 
contemporary plays and poems, arguing that these demonstrate that deceit and fraud about 
product quality were serious and widespread problems in the pre-industrial economy.
51 It 
must be recognized, however, that literature is written for particular purposes, and serves 
explicitly rhetorical and often normative ends. This makes it an unreliable guide to what was 
actually happening. Thus, for instance, poor craftsmanship was generally associated with 
wicked characters in morality plays, and served the purpose of making evil comprehensible in 
terms of everyday life; such allusions do not convey information about how widespread such 
wickedness was. Even if poor craftsmanship was widespread, frequent literary allusions to it 
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may as easily have arisen from guilds’ failure to control quality as from their desire or 
effectiveness in doing so.  
  Nor is the second main source of evidence for guilds’ importance in creating trust 
about product quality much more reliable. Legislation is the mainstay of the theoretical 
literature on pre-industrial guilds.
52 But it is a deeply questionable source of evidence about 
what guilds actually did.
53 For one thing, legislation resembles literature in serving purposes 
that are not apparent on the surface – that is, in having a hidden agenda. Second, early modern 
legislation was often not enforced. And third, the claims made by theorists about guild 
legislation are in many cases inaccurate. 
  Guild statutes certainly claimed that only guild members could be trusted to produce 
wares of an acceptable quality and that the guild was the only institution that could be trusted 
to enforce quality standards. But we must read such claims critically and consider the interests 
they served. Guild charters were often influenced or actually drafted by guild members 
themselves: much early modern urban and princely legislation had its origins in petitions 
submitted by concerned interest groups, and guild statutes were a prime example of this 
pattern.
54 Ensuring a high quality of wares sounds like an indisputable ‘good’ for society at 
large, although we will shortly examine reasons why enforcing high quality at all costs is not 
necessarily economically beneficial. Because maintaining product quality was viewed as 
unquestionably ‘good’, it provided a nearly indisputable rhetorical basis for justifying 
restrictions – such as entry barriers, output quotas, and price controls – that served more 
narrow group interests and would otherwise have aroused social and political opposition. 
  Furthermore, legislation is one thing and enforcement quite another. The statute 
books of early modern European towns and princes contained many regulations that were 
never implemented at all.
55 Other regulations on the statute-books enjoyed some enforcement, 
but nevertheless were widely evaded, creating black markets or ‘informal sectors’. In these 
cases, regulations did have an effect on the activities of individuals and the functioning of the 
wider economy, but not the one intended by princes, city governments, or guilds when they 
framed the regulations.
56 Finally, there were some regulations that were enforced – and left 
traces in non-legislative sources such as guild accounts or community court minutes – but 
were devised at the discretion of local guild officials and did not actually appear in formal 
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statutes. The general lesson is that although guild legislation can provide a guide to how 
guilds ought to have functioned, it must be checked against alternative sources of evidence in 
order to establish how they actually did function – whether in creating trust about product 
quality or any other matter.  
  Finally, even if legislation had been perfectly enforced, a number of the claims guild 
theorists have made about its content are quite inaccurate. Thus, for instance, the most 
influential proponent of the view that guilds were beneficial because they guaranteed quality 
states that ‘the majority of the guild statutes are concerned precisely with demands for a 
sufficiently high quality of product’ and that guilds imposed ‘exceedingly harsh sanctions for 
violating the quality regulations’.
57 But this is simply not the case. The only quantitative 
analysis of guild charters of which I am aware is that of the ordinances for the powerful 
weavers’ guilds which regulated the worsted proto-industry of the southern German state of 
Württemberg from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. In the four surviving ordinances 
for these guilds, only a minority of articles – in one ordinance, as few as 8 per cent – were 
even remotely concerned with quality control.
58 Moreover, the quality standards laid down 
were quite minimal. Here, as in many early modern textile industries, guild statutes merely set 
standard legal dimensions for wares (something easily checked by merchants and customers), 
but did not go in detail into quality issues involving matters that might have involved true 
information asymmetries between producers and customers. Nor were sanctions always 
‘exceedingly harsh’. The Württemberg worsted guilds imposed very light penalties on quality 
offences, fines that were significantly lower than those for offences against other guild norms; 
severe penalties such as destruction of wares, confiscation, imprisonment, or ejection from the 
guild never came into question.
59 The most powerful guilds in England, the livery companies 
of early modern London, also imposed very lenient penalties – apologies, fines, promises of 
reformation – ‘even in quite serious matters such as assaults [on guild quality inspectors] or 
the deliberate falsification of goods’.
60 The claim by guild theorists that guild statutes placed 
heavy emphasis on quality maintenance and penalized quality offences severely thus does not 
hold up to empirical scrutiny. 
  Equivalent quantitative analyses of the statutes of many more guilds would be 
necessary before one could place reliance on the claim that most guilds even in principle 
made it a priority to create trust between producers and consumers about product quality. 
Analysis of more and better sources – guild accounts, court records – would be necessary to 
establish that guilds actually succeeded in creating such trust. Indirect evidence comparing 
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quality outcomes in guilded and unguilded industries can help us address this question, but 
before we examine this evidence there is a fundamental theoretical problem to consider. 
  The claim that guilds were beneficial because they created trust about quality often 
takes for granted that what consumers wanted, and what was best for the economy, was a high 
absolute quality. Thus demand is supposed to have been low because consumers did not trust 
craftsmen to refrain from exploiting information advantages by producing low-quality 
products. A guild, by contrast, could create such consumer confidence by imposing rules 
ensuring that all craftsmen produced at or above a defined quality. This created particularized 
trust in a specific group of transaction partners – a belief that one could feel confidence in 
entering into a transaction with any person who was a member of the relevant guild, because 
its rules required him to produce high-quality goods.
61 It also created differential trust in a 
particular institution – the guild – as the guarantor of these rules. 
  But this argument rests on a basic confusion. The problem of ‘quality’ under 
asymmetric information relates to the variance, not the mean. The market failure is solved by 
guaranteeing not high quality but standard quality. This standard can be low, as long as the 
customer knows what it is.
62 To rescue the argument that guilds were beneficial because they 
created trust about product quality, therefore, we must revise it: guilds must have been an 
efficient institution for guaranteeing a standard – not a high – quality level. 
  In principle, guilds might indeed have constituted such an institution.
63 But they had a 
serious weakness in doing so. Most guilds justified a whole array of their most important 
regulations – entry barriers, output quotas, and price controls – by claiming that these were 
essential for ensuring high quality. Many also profited financially from setting inappropriately 
high quality standards. Thus, for instance, the London pewterers’ guild levied quality fines on 
products from provincial workshops ‘on the flimsiest pretext’, not because ‘the London 
company was driven by altruism to protect the populace at large from dubious goods’ but 
because of ‘the profit received from fines and from the sale of seized metal’, which it split 
with the Crown in return for enforcement of its charter.
64 Incentives such as these could lead 
guilds to impose inappropriately high quality standards. As we shall see shortly, in many 
early modern industries, a lower (but standardized) quality in combination with a lower price 
would have better addressed customer demand. But standard quality would not have 
functioned nearly so well as high quality in justifying long apprenticeship and 
journeymanship and bans on price competition, which ensured important streams of rents for 
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guild masters but would – without the excuse of quality control – have risked attracting social 
and political opposition.  
  Furthermore, for either maximizing quality or minimizing variance, there is a cost in 
terms of innovativeness, flexibility, and the ability to adjust to changing fashions and 
consumer preferences.
65 A single, monopolistic entity such as a guild might have been better 
placed than a variegated range of individual producers to guarantee the best possible quality 
or even a single, standard quality. But precisely these characteristics made a guild less able, 
and probably also less willing, to undertake the market research and the flexible response to 
changes in demand necessary to deliver the combinations of quality and price desired by a 
varied and changing population of consumers.
66 These issues were recognized by 
contemporaries such as the seventeenth-century English economist and merchant Josiah 
Child: 
All our laws that oblige our people to the making of strong, substantial, and, as we 
call it, loyal cloth, of a certain length, breadth, and weight, if they were duly put into 
execution would, in my opinion, do more hurt than good, because the humours and 
fashions of the world change, and at some times, in some places (as now in most), 
slight, cheap, light cloth will sell more plentifully and better than that which is 
heavier, stronger, and truer wrought; and if we intend to have the trade of the world 
we must imitate the Dutch, who make the worst as well as the best of all 
manufactures, that we may be in a capacity of serving all markets and all humours. I 
conclude all our laws limiting the number of looms, numbers or kind of servants, or 
times of working, to be certainly prejudicial to the clothing trade of the kingdom in 
general.
67 
Child was far from being the only contemporary to express scepticism about whether 
guild laws about quality were beneficial.
68 In many early modern industries, guild quality 
inspections were viewed as inadequate. Guild members who committed quality offences 
suffered minor sanctions in the short term and none in the long term.
69 Community officials 
and state bureaucrats incessantly exhorted individual guild members and guild inspectors to 
do their jobs better.
70 Merchants opted sooner or later to ignore guild inspections and set up 
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their own independent inspection arrangements. Precisely because guilds could not (or would 
not) themselves control quality, independent inspections by merchants, town officials, and 
state inspectors were necessary to enhance them, and in the most dynamic industries replaced 
them.
71 Merchants and customers were eager to purchase wares from non-guild producers – 
particularly peasants and women – precisely because the wares they produced had the same 
quality as those that passed guild inspections, but at a lower price.
72 
  There are good theoretical reasons why a closed social network may tend to give rise 
to just such an outcome – i.e., may not have the incentive to use its social capital of ‘trust’ for 
socially beneficial ends.
73 Once a guild possessed a state charter that endowed its members 
with the monopolistic entitlement to practise a particular occupation, there was often little 
outside pressure that could be placed on it to improve its performance – whether with regard 
to product quality or to any other aspect of its members’ behaviour.
74 As is clearly recognized 
in modern economies, self-regulating professional associations suffer from disincentives to 
offend or penalize their members, and must be closely monitored by governments and 
consumers. Certainly, early modern guild inspectors often lacked the incentive to develop the 
skills and deploy the effort necessary to detect low-quality work beyond superficial features 
(such as size) which, as contemporaries pointed out, were readily apparent to potential 
customers anyway.
75  
Furthermore, even if guild inspectors detected low-quality work, they had incentives 
to turn a blind eye, punish it leniently, or make excuses for a fellow guild master. Pre-
industrial European documentary sources are replete with cases in which customers 
complained about wares but guild officials were so reluctant to proceed that the customer had 
to appeal to state authorities to have the complaint taken at all seriously. Thus, for instance, in 
1793 Anna Maria Schultheiß, the mayor’s wife in the small Württemberg town of Wildberg, 
complained to the foremen of the linen-weavers’ guild that a length of linen she had just 
bought from Salomo Roller was of poor quality but the faults had been hidden through 
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fulling. The guild foremen were reluctant to take action, not only letting the cloth pass the 
guild inspection but also accepting it as a master-piece and admitting Roller to mastership. 
Their only response to Anna Maria’s complaint was to say that she need not pay Roller, 
‘leaving the payment of a weaving-wage to her free will’. Anna Maria was only able to get 
the matter taken seriously by prevailing on a male neighbour to inquire at the Rüggericht – an 
annual community assembly of male citizens in front of the princely district governor – why, 
despite this poor-quality master-piece, Roller ‘had nevertheless been admitted to mastership’. 
Even then, the court decided that ‘because one was already convinced of Roller’s skill in the 
profession from other information received, he could not be rejected’.
76 Thus in a guilded 
economy a dissatisfied customer had to take her case to the community or state authorities 
anyway, and might only succeed in doing so if she was the mayor’s wife. Even then, the 
influence of guild masters could be such as to preclude any penalty against the fraudulent 
master other than the customer’s not having to pay for faulty wares – precisely the same 
outcome as in an unguilded situation. Anna Maria could not even change suppliers since 
guilded weavers (including the one who had cheated her) were the only legal producers and 
sellers of linen and only a few were allowed to do business in each community: thus in 1793 
the fraudulent (or at least unskilled) Salomo Roller was one of only two linen masters in 
Wildberg. 
For these reasons, it is not clear that consumers were worse off when guilds were 
weak or absent. In weakly guilded industries, a dissatisfied customer had to take his 
complaint to the state – a Justice of the Peace, a community council sitting, a state court.
77 
Thus in early modern England, ‘the maker or seller of a substandard ware was liable to 
forfeiture of the ware or its value, which was recoverable by court action, one half of the 
proceeds going to the Crown and the other half to the person who sued’.
78 Examination of the 
tailoring trade in early modern London ‘suggests that many customers were prepared to sue 
their suppliers in the city courts’.
79 But in strongly guilded Württemberg, Anna Maria 
Schultheiß had to take her case beyond the guild to the state authorities anyway, even to 
obtain a hearing. In an economy with weak guilds or none, a dissatisfied customer might even 
gain fairer justice than in a guilded one, since the state would be less subject to guild pressure. 
That is, in the absence of organized producer interest groups, the state had a greater capacity 
to dispense impartial justice and attract uniform rather than differential trust from its citizens. 
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Even in the comparatively weakly guilded Netherlands, ‘for consumers, the guilds were no 
unalloyed benefit’, but at least ‘the town governments could regulate [the guilds] to serve 
consumer interests by fixing prices and demanding quality guarantees’.
80  
In cases where the state failed to dispense uniform justice, the disgruntled customer in 
a weakly guilded economy could turn to another ‘uniform’ institution: she could take her 
custom elsewhere in an open market that did not grant ‘differential’ privileges to guild 
producers. This option was closed to her in a strongly guilded economy where she was 
obliged to go on patronizing local guild masters whose legal monopoly not only limited their 
numbers (and hence the customer’s choice) but also protected their low-quality output from 
competition. Thus in Wiltshire or Yorkshire, when a weaver produced shoddy cloth, 
customers, factors, and merchants could simply shift their custom to another of the large and 
competitive population of dispersed rural weavers, since no guild privileges compelled 
customers to go on patronizing a small circle of established masters irrespective of the quality 
of their wares.
81 In early modern London, ‘those customers who were not satisfied ... could 
simply take their business elsewhere ... customers were themselves far from naïve’.
82 
Precisely the lack of guild restrictions on customers’ capacity to shun unskilled or fraudulent 
producers led a craftsman such as the seventeenth-century London turner Nehemiah 
Wallington to perceive ‘that any frauds he perpetrated, no matter how accidentally, would 
rebound severely’ – not because he would be punished by his guild, but because his 
customers would turn elsewhere.
83 In short, the lack of guild restrictions preventing the 
customer from taking her custom elsewhere on an open market led to a growing recognition 
that, in the words of one eighteenth-century Yorkshire clothier, ‘The interest of the seller is 
sufficient security to the buyer for fair dealing’.
84  
These examples from weakly guilded industries in early modern Europe suggest that 
in the absence of guild privileges, both the state and the market were more likely to function 
impartially, helping to create a ‘uniform’ trust in institutions that would enforce the contracts 
of anyone rather than a ‘differential’ trust in institutions that only enforced the rights of guild 
members. This uniform trust in impartial institutions was in turn more likely to generate a 
‘generalized’ trust in strangers which could gradually displace the ‘particularized’ trust in 
persons of known attributes or group affiliations. 
  Empirical comparisons across different European industries appear to confirm that 
guilds were not necessarily efficient institutions for creating trust between producers and 
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consumers about product quality. Those industries that were most successful at attracting and 
satisfying customers – the best measure of consumer ‘trust’ in product quality available to 
modern economic historians – were not the ones with the strongest (or necessarily any) 
guilds. From the early sixteenth century onward, the same industry was often strongly guilded 
in one part of Europe, weakly guilded in another, and guild-free in a third. Thus rural linen 
weaving, worsted weaving, cotton weaving, scythe making, lace making, and the making of 
small iron goods were guilded in many parts of Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Bohemia, 
Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, but weakly guilded in Scotland, Switzerland, and Ireland, and 
wholly unguilded in most parts of England and the Low Countries.
85 Yet indisputably the most 
successful industries in Europe were those in the Low Countries and England, where guild 
restrictions were totally absent from many lively rural industrial regions and in the course of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries lost most of their powers in towns.
86  
Even in the medieval period there were cities such as Douai which developed 
successful, high-quality export industries without quality enforcement through guilds.
87 
Shortly after 1500, the Flemish village of Hondschoote developed the first successful New 
Draperies export industry without imposing any guild quality controls until the late sixteenth 
century, ‘after it had passed its apogee’.
88 By the mid-sixteenth century, even the powerful 
London companies are described as being ‘not overly concerned with issues of quality 
control; the nature of goods remained largely an issue for customers and retailers to negotiate 
in the marketplace’.
89 In the eighteenth century, the West Riding of Yorkshire developed the 
most successful worsted industry in Europe by producing ‘cheap and nasty’ cloths subject to 
no quality controls by guilds: quality was monitored by merchants at point of sale.
90 By 1753 
it was possible for an English Parliamentary Committee to state categorically that guilds’ 
powers to search craft workshops to enforce quality regulations were ‘illegal and contrary to 
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the Liberty of the subject; tending to a Monopoly; discouraging the Manufacture and 
destroying the Trade of the Kingdom’.
91 Yet for long after this date, guild quality inspections 
remained powerful in many continental European crafts and proto-industries.
92 
  Judging by the eagerness of customers across the world to buy the innovative and 
low-cost Flemish, Dutch, and English worsteds, woollens, linens, and (ultimately) cottons, the 
largely unguilded industries of these economies were outstandingly good at creating trust 
between producers and consumers. But the trust they created was not a ‘particularized’ trust 
in guild members or the ‘differential’ trust in guilds as institutions enforcing the privileges of 
guild members and the rights of those consumers that complied with guild monopsonies. 
Rather, it was a ‘generalized’ trust in unknown transaction partners mediated by a ‘uniform’ 
trust in an impartial institutional framework that enforced contracts regardless of personal 
attributes of the contracting parties. Industries in these economies were exceptionally good at 
creating trust among consumers that markets were conveying reasonably accurate signals 
about product quality and that the state would punish breaches of contract – in short, a 
confidence in buying things anonymously from people whose personal attributes and guild 
affiliations one did not know, using institutional mechanisms that were accessible to anyone. 
This suggests that these economies and their industries flourished not because they 
encouraged the particularized and differential trust fostered by guilds, but because they 
gradually discouraged and replaced it with the generalized and uniform trust generated by 
states and markets. 
 
3.2. Guilds, Trust and Training 
 
The market for human capital is a second arena in which guilds are supposed to have used 
their social capital to create trust which benefited the entire economy. According to this view, 
pre-industrial crafts were highly skilled activities that required extensive formal training. But 
training markets are supposed to have functioned poorly because information asymmetries 
and fear of opportunistic behaviour created a lack of trust between trainers and trainees. 
Consequently, it is claimed, good masters found it impossible to identify good potential 
apprentices and journeymen, and vice versa. This is held to have given rise to an 
unwillingness on both sides to enter into training contracts, leading to under-investment in 
training, scarcity of skilled labour, lower productivity, and foregone output.
93 
  Guilds are supposed to have generated the trust that solved these market 
imperfections. They did so through fostering four shared norms. First, they imposed 
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admissions requirements, thereby enabling masters to trust applicants to apprenticeship 
positions. Guilds usually imposed prerequisites on anyone wishing to become an apprentice, 
requiring him to be (for example) male, son of an existing guild master, son of a local 
community citizen, member of the same religious confession as existing guild members, 
certifiably legitimate offspring of married parents (sometimes even of legitimately married 
grandparents or great-grandparents), able to pay high apprenticeship fees, or non-member of 
particular ‘defiling’ groups (Jews, Roma, knackers, executioners, etc.). The function of these 
admissions requirements, according to modern theorists, was to act as a signal that the 
apprentice and master belonged to the same social network. Shared network membership 
meant a master could trust that an apprentice would behave well during training and vice 
versa. Second, guilds promulgated regulations penalizing opportunistic behaviour by masters 
and apprentices once the training contract had been signed, thereby further ensuring that 
potential trainers and trainees could trust one another. Third, guilds issued apprenticeship 
certificates with the purpose of enabling masters to identify good journeymen – that is, to 
trust applicants for employment because of their group affiliation with the guild. Finally, 
guilds imposed mastership admissions requirements with the aim of enabling apprentices to 
identify skilled trainers – that is, they created a particularized trust in those employers who 
could demonstrate that they had the appropriate group affiliation and a differential trust in the 
guild as an institution which would enforce training contracts between guild members.
94  
  Once again, legislation is the empirical mainstay of the view that guilds created trust 
that made markets in human capital and skilled labour work better. Guild legislation always 
made elaborate provisions for apprenticeship, journeymanship, masterpiece examinations, and 
mastership admission requirements. But for the reasons discussed in the preceding section, we 
must read guild statutes critically with an eye to the interests they served. Like product 
quality, labour skills could be portrayed as unquestionably a good thing, and hence could be 
used to justify regulations that would otherwise evoke social opposition. Moreover, like guild 
statutes governing product quality, those governing apprenticeship, journeymanship and 
mastership were not invariably implemented, were evaded (resulting in black market activity), 
or were interpreted in ways that benefited particular interests. 
  Quite apart from the question whether legislation can be trusted to reflect 
enforcement, apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership requirements potentially served 
two different purposes. One was to create the particularized trust that would encourage 
masters to offer and apprentices to undertake skilled training because they could have 
confidence that each other’s characteristics had been screened by the guild. The other was to 
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enable established producers to restrict entry to the industry, thereby protecting themselves 
from competition.
95 The particularized trust in guild masters, journeymen and apprentices 
thus had the potential to be used to encourage human capital investments by insiders or 
abused to exclude outsiders.  
  To find out which predominated, we need independent evidence bearing on the 
following four questions: First, was extensive formal training necessary in all activities that 
were guilded? Second, were guilds the best way to ensure such training? Third, how did 
guilds manage the trade-off between the training and exclusion functions of their regulations? 
And fourth, were industries with strong guild structures also ones that achieved optimal levels 
of training? When such evidence is considered, it reveals a more complicated picture than the 
optimistic view that guild rules created the trust that encouraged optimal human capital 
investment.  
  First, how important was formal training to early modern economies? Contrary to the 
claims of early modern guilds themselves and enthusiasts for guilds among modern social 
scientists, there were many economic activities in pre-industrial Europe that did not require 
very high levels of skill, hence did not require prolonged formal training, and yet were 
guilded.
96 This was certainly true of the wool textile industry, especially after the spread of 
the New Draperies from the later sixteenth century. It also applied to the linen industry, which 
expanded rapidly from the seventeenth century on and accelerated in the eighteenth century 
on a very low skill basis: although linen production was unguilded in most parts of northwest 
Europe, it remained guilded into the later eighteenth century in many parts of central, eastern 
and southern Europe. As a general rule, the most flourishing textile industries in early modern 
Europe produced cheap cloths that required little skill to make, but precisely for that reason 
were affordable by a much wider mass market than the expensive old-style woollen 
broadcloths or silk-based fabrics. Worsted and linen weaving were easily learned – 
contemporaries often remarked that they could be grasped in a few weeks or months. Thus 
they could be successfully practised without formal guild training, and yet they were often 
guilded. Indeed, contemporaries remarked of many guilded activities – not just cheap textile 
production – either that they needed no formal training at all, or that they required many 
fewer years of training that guild rules demanded. It seems unlikely that crafts requiring high 
levels of skilled training represented a very large proportion of overall industrial activity, 
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since textiles were by far the most important industrial sector, and a large and growing share 
of textile production was in the low-skilled worsted, light woollen, linen, and cotton branches. 
This suggests that any harm done by lack of trust between trainers and trainees may simply 
not have affected large sectors of the early modern economy. 
  Indisputably, however, there were industrial activities in early modern Europe that 
did require formal training.
97 The second question we must address, therefore, is whether 
guilds were the best institution for ensuring such training. On the one hand there is evidence 
of a proliferation of private apprenticeship contracts in economies as distant and dissimilar as 
seventeenth-century England and nineteenth-century Russia, indicating that guilds were not 
necessary to create the trust to induce masters and apprentices to enter into training 
agreements.
98 On the other, there are documentary sources that cast doubt on whether guilds 
were sufficient to create such trust. Court records, petitions, and official reports from most 
early modern European industries make it clear that if guild rules created trust between 
masters and apprentices, this trust was often misplaced. Masters throughout early modern 
Europe profited by taking on apprentices to whom they did not pay wages on the grounds that 
they were educating them, and then exploiting them as cheap agricultural and household 
labour instead of training them. Apprentices throughout early modern Europe violated their 
masters’ trust by shirking their lessons and absconding before they had repaid the master for 
his investment in their training.
99 
  Many guilds passed apprentices through to journeymanship, and journeymen through 
to mastership, without actually examining their skills in any serious way. In many – perhaps 
most – early modern crafts, apprenticeship certificates were issued automatically at the end of 
a certain period of years, without the trainee’s even going through the formality of an 
examination. Most guilds required a journeyman to produce a masterpiece and be examined 
on it. But in practice, if the journeyman satisfied the other entry requirements (male gender, 
payment of fees, minimum period of tramping, appropriate confessional affiliation, 
community citizenship, etc.), the quality of his masterpiece often played little or no role in his 
being awarded a mastership license.
100 
  That guilds conferred mastership licenses without seriously testing skills was widely 
recognized by contemporaries. Thus, for instance, in 1669 a guilded bathman and surgeon in 
the small Bohemian town of Friedland petitioned for protection against a wide array of 
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competitors – including an executioner’s widow and several old village women – to whom 
local patients were flocking. Overlords in eastern Europe under the second serfdom were 
generally not as indulgent to guilds as community authorities in central and western Europe, 
and the Friedland manorial court rejected the guild master’s petition, pointing out that  
it is not sufficient in itself that the petitioner has gone through his apprenticeship 
years and journeymanship years, but besides this, skill [die Kunst] is required; now 
since it is common knowledge that this man not only is unfortunate in his cures, but 
also does not grasp his profession and skill [Kunst] as he should, therefore patients 
cannot be forbidden to beserve themselves of alternative assistance and have 
themselves cured by others.
101  
Even in such a highly skilled activity as medicine, seventeenth-century customers showed a 
clear-sighted recognition that guild apprenticeship and journeymanship were not sufficient for 
guaranteeing skills, and that untrained old women and ‘untouchable’ executioners’ widows 
might be trusted to practise this activity with much greater skill than a guild-trained master.  
  Such examples can be multiplied for guilded activities throughout pre-industrial 
Europe. ‘Encroachers’ who failed to secure guild training – often, as in the case of females, 
because guilds excluded them from formal apprenticeship and journeymanship
102 – were 
bitterly opposed by early modern guilds. This was not because encroachers passed off low-
quality wares under the guild trademark: as we saw in the preceding section, many guilds did 
not police quality seriously, whether from incapacity, weak incentives as monopolists, or a 
combination of both. Rather, guilds opposed non-guild-trained ‘encroachers’ so bitterly 
precisely because the wares and services they provided were just as attractive to customers as 
those of guild-trained masters.
103 Women, Jews, and other excluded groups were perceived by 
guild masters throughout Europe as serious competitors, despite being visible minorities 
whom customers could easily identify as non-possessors of guild training. If the mutual trust 
created by guilds really had resulted in more appropriate levels of skilled training than were 
manifested by unguilded producers, then guilds would not have had to use legal coercion to 
compel customers to consume their products rather than those of ‘inadequately’ trained 
outsiders. Nor would individual guild masters have been so keen to employ non-guild-trained 
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free-lancers, whom they evidently trusted to produce work of sufficient quality not only to 
satisfy customers but also to pass guild quality inspections.  
  Guilds were thus in many cases not an optimal institution for ensuring appropriate 
training, even in those activities which did require high levels of skill. It seems likely that it 
was theoretically inevitable as well as empirically widespread for guilds to issue licenses to 
masters who did not ‘grasp their profession and skill as they should’. As associations of 
masters, guilds had strong incentives to certify members’ sons without question and to permit 
opportunism by masters who could not be bothered to train their apprentices or journeymen. 
That is, having once used their social capital to foster a particularized trust in persons with a 
particular group affiliation, guilds had incentives to abuse that trust for the profit of their 
members. 
  The recognition that guilds had incentives to abuse their trust to benefit their 
members leads to a third question. Given that apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership 
regulations could in theory function both to encourage training and to exclude outsiders, 
which predominated in practice? There is certainly plenty of evidence to indicate that guilds 
did use training regulations to exclude outsiders, thereby reducing competition for their own 
members. Wherever early modern guilds had the power to do so, they used their 
apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership regulations to exclude not only women, 
Jews, and bastards, but also members of other Christian confessions than the local one, Roma, 
foreigners, serfs, members of ‘untouchable’ occupations, paupers, individuals unable to pay 
admission fees and provide deposits, and in many cases anyone who was not the son of a 
local citizen or an existing guild master.
104 It is often claimed that such admission barriers 
were not binding constraints and did not prevent entry. But documentary sources suggest that 
guild fees and other requirements did exclude many applicants – and where they did not, it 
was because the guild was too weak to enforce them rather than because it was uninterested in 
doing so. 
  In particular, guilds’ contradictory treatment of women demonstrates clearly that 
guild rules on training were directed not at using trust to encourage optimal levels of human 
capital investment, but at abusing the trust of customers by protecting established producers 
from competition. Girls were almost invariably excluded from guild training, except in a few 
large cities where they were allowed to join guilds in ‘feminine’ crafts such as mantua-
making or embroidering. When unmarried females nevertheless practised guilded activities, 
they were harshly penalized as ‘encroachers’. Yet black-market female encroachers were 
skilled enough to produce wares that satisfied the requirements of customers and merchants 
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and (when such women worked illegally for guild masters) also to make wares that passed 
guild inspectors. Women without formal guild training engaged in skilled craft work 
throughout pre-industrial Europe, wherever guilds failed to put them out of business.
105 
  At the same time, wives of guild masters were generally permitted to engage in any 
craft task, and masters’ widows were often allowed to inherit the guild workshop. In some 
important guilded industries in early modern Europe, 15-30 per cent of workshops were 
operated by widows.
106 Such widows did not simply carry over workshops for brief transitional 
periods, but often operated them for decades. Furthermore, a wife’s or widow’s guild license 
was seldom made conditional on the length of time she had been married. In one guilded 
industry where detailed figures are available, 20 per cent of practising widows had been married 
for a shorter period of time than the minimum duration of male apprenticeship and 
journeymanship combined.
107 Nor did widows generally work through trained male employees: 
widows were almost invariably forbidden to employee cheap apprentice labour, and 
journeymen were so costly than only a tiny minority of masters – male or female – could afford 
to employ them. The vast majority of widows produced the wares themselves, without guild-
trained male assistants.
108  
  This contradictory treatment by guilds of different groups of untrained females casts 
serious doubt on the idea that guild training regulations were directed at fostering a social 
capital of trust to solve imperfections in markets for human capital investments rather than at 
excluding outsiders so as to reduce competition. On the one hand, a non-trivial group of 
untrained women with legal entitlements from the guild as masters’ wives and widows was 
permitted and able to produce wares which passed guild and merchant inspections and sold 
successfully on markets. On the other, vast numbers of similarly untrained women – and men – 
who lacked such entitlements and were capable of doing the same activities were forbidden to 
do so on the grounds that they had not undergone guild apprenticeship. Indeed, the strong 
objections of London companies to aliens practising craft occupations in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries were intensified ‘by the fact that these foreign craftsmen were often more 
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highly skilled than their native counterparts’.
109 Such findings suggest that the exclusionary 
functions of apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership outweighed their training 
functions. 
This raises to a further question. Did human capital investment fail in crafts which 
lacked guilds? No. Human capital investment did not require guilds. In the guilded economies 
of central and southern Europe, apprenticeships were indeed enforced by guilds. But in 
weakly guilded or unguilded economies such as England, Flanders, and even Russia, 
apprenticeships were voluntarily entered into by trainees and trainers, who registered their 
apprenticeships as private contracts in the market and enforced them (where necessary) in 
courts of law.
110 In the West of England, for instance, ‘formal apprenticeship was almost 
entirely lacking ... but all trades observed “colting”, the customary form of apprenticeship of 
being “brought up in the trade” which ... did have full legal sanction’.
111 In the West Riding of 
Yorkshire, apprenticeship survived very widely, but as a voluntary contract between 
individuals rather than a guild requirement – in the words of one eighteenth-century clothier, 
‘rather from custom than from a sense of the Law’.
112  
In certain respects, apprenticeships were more widely available in weakly guilded 
economies such as the Low Countries and England, because they were open to those whom 
guilds usually excluded – children who could not afford high guild premiums, females, and 
even Jews.
113 Thus girls made up 9 per cent of all apprentices registered in Essex and 
Staffordshire in the second half of the eighteenth century, and fully 33 per cent of all 
apprentices put out to training by their parishes.
114 By contrast, in the Württemberg district of 
Wildberg among apprentices registered by the worsted-weavers’ and bakers’ guilds between 
1597 and 1760, or put out to parish apprenticeships by the communal church courts between 
1645 and 1800, the percentage of girls was zero.
115  
Apprenticeship was thus a widespread institution for transmitting human capital in 
early modern Europe, with or without guilds. The difference was that unguilded economies let 
producers decide for themselves what level of skill to invest in, privately contract in markets 
to secure craft training, and bring violations of training contracts before state courts for 
punishment.
116 This permitted apprenticeships to decline in sectors where lengthy training 
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was irrelevant – such as low-skilled linen or worsted industries addressing cheap mass 
markets – but flourish in skilled crafts where formal training enhanced productivity. 
Nor were guild apprenticeships necessarily any more effective than non-guild ones. 
The shared norms and collective sanctions provided by guilds may have enabled masters to 
discipline shirking apprentices but it hardly gave the latter much recourse against shirking 
masters. Shirking masters clearly existed in strongly guilded economies. Thus, for instance, in 
1624 the Württemberg orphan Bastian Heckh ran away from his master because ‘the master 
made use of the lad all the time in the vineyard and in the fields’.
117 In 1798, likewise, the 
grandfather of the Württemberg apprentice Johannes Ischinger removed him from his master 
because he ‘was being held to hard work in the fields’.
118 But such masters were seldom 
prosecuted by guilds: the 653 offences fined by the worsted-weavers’ guild in Württemberg 
district of Wildberg between 1597 and 1760 included only one penalty inflicted on a master 
for failures of training (he neglected to set up the equipment for his apprentice before letting 
him begin weaving).
119 
It is therefore not clear that training contracts were better enforced or human capital 
more effectively transmitted in guilded economies than in those in which guilds were weak or 
absent. In England or the Netherlands, a dissatisfied master or apprentice had to take his 
complaint to the state – a Justice of the Peace, a community council sitting, a state court. But 
in strongly guilded Württemberg, that is what apprentices and their families had to do 
anyway, since guilds of masters were, understandably, not highly motivated to penalize 
masters who failed to treat their apprentices properly. In 1624 Bastian Heckh absconded from 
his neglectful master ‘with the idea that he would probably find a master who would finish his 
training’, but ended up having to get his guardians to sue his equally neglectful and abusive 
new master before a community court chaired by a princely district official.
120 In 1798, 
Johannes Ischinger’s grandfather had to take his grandson away from his neglectful master 
‘arbitrarily’ in order even to gain a hearing from the community court.
121 In an economy with 
weak guilds or none, a neglected apprentice might even gain fairer justice than in a guilded 
one, since courts would be less subject to guild pressure, and thus less likely simply to order, 
as the Wildberg authorities did, that ‘Young Ischinger be given back to ... his master 
according to the contract that had been concluded’.
122 
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Even in cases where the state failed to dispense uniform justice, in an unguilded 
economy the neglected apprentice had another ‘uniform’ institution to turn to: he could seek 
training elsewhere in an open labour market that did not grant ‘differential’ privileges to guild 
masters; he could even obtain training informally (e.g. through ‘colting’) without 
subsequently being denied the right to practise as a master. This option was closed to him in a 
guilded economy where he was legally obliged to stay with his master, other guild masters 
were forbidden to accept absconding apprentices without lengthy formalities, and someone 
who absconded from a neglectful master would be forever denied permission to set up in 
business independently. In England, when a weaving master failed to train his apprentice 
satisfactorily, the apprentice typically sought training elsewhere, whether formally or 
informally.
123 Thus, for instance, the eighteenth-century apprentice Hirst absconded from a 
cruel master, but nevertheless rose to become a prominent Yorkshire textile manufacturer.
124 
Notwithstanding the absence of guild apprenticeships, according to one eighteenth-century 
Yorkshire master clothier ‘we think it a scandal when an apprentice is loose if he is not fit for 
his business; we take pride in their being fit for their business, and we teach them all they will 
take’.
125 Comparisons across European economies thus show both that training contracts were 
widespread without guild intervention, and that in the absence of guild privileges states and 
markets enforced training contracts in the interests not just of masters but also of apprentices. 
This raises a final question. Were early modern industries with strong guild structures 
also the ones that achieved optimal levels of training? Our best measure of an optimal level of 
training is that which enabled a group of industrial producers most successfully to satisfy 
customers and expand sales. From the later fifteenth century on, as we saw in the previous 
section, the same industry might be strongly guilded in one part of Europe, weakly guilded in 
another, and totally unguilded in a third. Yet those groups of European producers that 
possessed the optimal level of skills for satisfying customers were not the ones with the 
strongest (or necessarily any) guilds. Thus, as already mentioned, expanding groups of proto-
industrial producers in the Low Countries and England escaped guild training almost wholly, 
yet produced their wares with sufficient skill to attract, retain, and expand their international 
customer base. The most successful and dynamic worsted industries, for instance – those in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Flanders and eighteenth-century Yorkshire – either 
relaxed guild training requirements or abandoned them altogether.
126 The same was true of 
many other crafts and industries that successfully addressed the expanding consumer markets 
of the early modern period, as shown by the decline of apprenticeship among London 
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cordwainers (shoemakers) between the sixteenth and seventeenth century.
127 As early as 1669, 
the English Privy Council declared that although the 1563 Statute of Artificers requiring any 
craftsman to have served a seven-year apprenticeship had not been repealed, nevertheless it 
‘has been by most of the Judges looked upon as inconvenient to Trade and to the Encrease of 
inventions’.
128 
  In questions of human capital investment, therefore, some European economies 
continued into the eighteenth or nineteenth century to rely on the ‘particularized’ trust in 
persons with known group affiliations and ‘differential’ trust in guilds as the institution for 
enforcing training contracts. But other economies began as early as the sixteenth or seventeenth 
century to shift towards a ‘generalized’ trust which applied even to strangers underpinned by a 
‘uniform’ trust in an impartial institutional framework of markets and states that enforced 
contracts regardless of personal attributes of the contracting parties.  
Precisely how and why this shift from ‘particularized’ to ‘generalized’ trust occurred 
awaits full clarification, and is one of the most important questions facing both economic 
historians of early modern Europe and economists analysing modern developing economies. 
But the evidence on guilds suggests that – at least in European economic development – 
particularized trust may not have encouraged generalized trust (as social capital theorists would 
have it), but rather may have substituted for it. Early modern economies tended to rely in 
matters of human capital investment either on a particularized trust in guild members linked to a 
differential trust in guilds as institutions, or on a generalized trust in strangers mediated by a 
uniform trust in impersonal markets and impartial states, but not both simultaneously. This is 
not surprising, since particularized trust in persons of known attributes and differential trust in 
guilds meant that certain markets (e.g. for industrial training) were only accessible to persons 
licensed by the appropriate guild, and the state’s contract enforcement was also biased toward 
members of that group. In other words, members of early modern economies that were highly 
guilded may not have been able to afford to evince generalized trust in strangers or a uniform 
trust in impartial markets and states because the prevalence of particularized trust in guild 
members and differential trust in guilds prevented markets and states from being impartial. 
 
3.3. Guilds, Trust, and Technology 
 
The market for information – particularly for technological innovations – is the third sphere in 
which guilds are supposed to have used their social capital to create trust that benefited the 
entire economy. The idea that special institutional arrangements may be necessary to deal 
with new technological ideas is based on the recognition that markets for information have 
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imperfections that can impede innovation. Information is a ‘public good’: it is ‘non-
excludable’ (once an idea has been sold to one consumer, it is hard to prevent it from being 
communicated without charge to others) and ‘non-rival’ (the producer of an idea incurs no 
higher costs by providing it to extra consumers). These characteristics mean that the social 
benefits of public goods such as information may exceed their private benefits. As a result, 
ideas and information about them will tend to be under-provided by private individuals 
transacting in markets. Innovative ideas may be either not invented at all, since potential 
inventors cannot profit from their own efforts; or invented but diffused only to a few paying 
customers so that private inventors can profit, even though at zero additional cost these ideas 
could benefit society more widely.  
  Guilds, it is sometimes argued, solved these problems. First, they are supposed to 
have operated much in the manner of a patent system, by creating monopoly rents for 
innovators, thereby overcoming the disincentives to innovation created by the fact that it is 
difficult to exclude users of new information. Second, guilds are regarded as having overcome 
barriers to the diffusion of new practices, by obliging all practitioners to seek work outside 
the local area for a minimum period as journeymen before becoming masters. Third, guilds 
are portrayed as guaranteeing the smooth transmission of technical expertise across 
generations by requiring all practitioners to undergo guild apprenticeship. And finally, guilds 
are supposed to have eased horizontal technology transfers by promoting the spatial clustering 
of craft practitioners.
129    
All these arguments are based on the idea that guilds favoured technological 
innovation by generating a differential trust in themselves as institutions and a particularized 
trust in their members. All are theoretically possible. But none as yet enjoys convincing 
empirical support. And there are both theoretical and empirical arguments that cast doubt on 
the idea that guilds in general used their trust to foster innovation in these socially beneficial 
ways. 
  The first argument is that guilds created among their members a trust in the guild as 
an institution that would ensure that the right to make use of any new techniques they might 
invent would be restricted, along with the practice of the occupation, to the narrow circle of 
guild members, thereby guaranteeing a future stream of monopoly rents to reward current 
investment in innovation. This is based on an idea advanced many years ago by Joseph 
Schumpeter, that a producer with a monopoly in a particular sector will have a greater ability 
to innovate than his competitive counterpart because monopoly profits will relax funding 
constraints on R&D investment, and that he will have greater incentive to innovate because he 
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stands to lose so much more.
130 This theoretical proposition has been explored exhaustively 
by economic theorists, and is often invoked in modern antitrust cases.
131  
However, the empirical support for it has always been ambiguous. For one thing, 
while it is often the case that large firms innovate more, it may be their size (and thus the 
economies of scale they can reap) rather than their market dominance that gives them the 
finance or incentive to do so. Second, while unusually profitable firms do often innovate 
more, it may be that the causation runs from innovation to profitability rather than vice versa. 
Third, financing incentives created by a monopoly are difficult to disentangle from the effects 
of demand-pull, which increases both profits and inventive effort. Finally, monopoly profits 
are only one of many possible funding sources for investments in innovation.
132  
  The predictions of economic theory on the relationship between monopoly and 
innovation are also ambiguous. As Scherer and Ross put it, ‘through an astute choice of 
assumptions, virtually any market structure can be shown to have superior innovative 
qualities.’
133 Furthermore, even economic models that show how a monopolistic market 
structure could favour innovation require there to be no barriers to entry. That is, for the 
monopolist to have good incentives to innovate, in these models it must be possible for a 
potential competitor who comes up with a new technique or product that might threaten the 
monopolist’s rents actually to enter the market. If there are barriers to entry – such as guild 
licensing restrictions – that limit the number of producers and prevent potential competitors 
from entering the market, then the monopolist loses any special incentive to invest in 
innovation.
134  
  Pre-industrial guilds could certainly provide their members with monopoly rents, 
assuring masters that the right to practice the occupation would remain restricted to the 
narrow circle of guild members, and thus that any innovations in that sector would be 
rewarded by a future stream of monopoly rents. These rents might have increased a 
craftsman’s incentive to incur the costs of developing an innovation compared to a normal 
competitive market where he would not have been able to charge monopoly prices. But guilds 
created these rents by erecting barriers to entry – by using apprenticeship, journeymanship, 
and mastership requirements to limit the number of producers and prevent potential 
competitors from moving into the market. Moreover, guilds limited workshop size, fixed 
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output quotas, set prices collectively, and required collective approval and adoption of any 
new equipment or wares. This prevented potential innovators from undercutting their fellows 
and reaping a greater share of rents. Monopoly rents went to all masters, irrespective of 
whether they were innovative. Guild entry barriers meant there was no threat that a potential 
competitor who came up with a new technique could enter the market and threaten members’ 
rents. In short, guilds did generate monopoly rents for their members, but there is no evidence 
that these rents rewarded innovation. 
  The second way in which guilds are supposed to have used their social capital to 
favour innovation was by creating trust within the wider society in the guild as an institution 
that would compel journeymen to travel. This is supposed to have ensured that, although new 
techniques remained a monopoly of guild members locally, they were swiftly spread to guilds 
in other localities. The evidence adduced in support of this idea consists in the fact that many 
(though not all) guilds required journeymen to travel for a minimum number of years before 
they were allowed to set in independent practice, and that this was sometimes justified in 
terms of their learning (though not usually teaching) new techniques during their travels.
135  
  However, doubt is cast on this argument by evidence relating to migration in pre-
industrial European societies. Guilds were certainly not necessary to ensure migration of 
young workers in early modern Europe, since such workers were highly mobile even in 
guildless sectors such as agriculture.
136 Nor were guilds sufficient to ensure migration of 
young craft workers and the information they embodied. The Netherlands, for instance, 
enjoyed legendary labour mobility and even more legendary levels of technological 
innovation in the seventeenth century, while differing from Germany, France, and England in 
having guilds that did not require journeymen to travel.
137 Furthermore, as contemporary 
commentators lamented, many guilds actively excluded any technological innovations that 
journeymen might have diffused into their home region by prohibiting the settlement of 
foreign journeymen.
138 Guild tramping requirements were thus neither necessary nor 
sufficient for creating the trust to ensure diffusion of new techniques. 
  The third way in which guilds are supposed to have used their social capital to favour 
innovation was by enforcing minimum periods of training, thereby encouraging a smooth 
transmission of technical expertise between generations. That is, guilds created trust among 
masters that technological secrets they transferred would not immediately be used to set up a 
competing workshop, but rather delayed for at least the minimum legal duration of 
apprenticeship and journeymanship. The evidence adduced in support of this proposition is 
the existence of guild regulations imposing minimum periods of apprenticeship and 
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journeymanship. In practice, however, as we have seen, many of the most successful early 
modern European industries increasingly dispensed with guild apprenticeships (or never had 
them). Yet these industries’ growth suggests that they transmitted techniques effectively. 
Guild apprenticeship and journeymanship, therefore, were neither sufficient nor necessary to 
ensure effective transmission of technical expertise between generations. 
  The final way in which guilds are supposed to have used their social capital to favour 
innovation was by enforcing spatial clustering for purposes of monitoring workshops. This, it 
is argued, could have created an atmosphere of multiplex interactions and neighbourly trust 
that favoured horizontal transmission of technical expertise among practitioners. The 
evidence adduced in support of this proposition is that in many pre-industrial cities members 
of the same craft clustered in particular streets or neighbourhoods. But other evidence casts 
doubt on this idea. Guilds were certainly not necessary to bring about spatial clustering: 
industrial agglomeration is widely observed in most economies, including modern guildless 
ones, because it brings a whole array of advantages that have been quite thoroughly analyzed 
by economists.
139 Nor was spatial clustering either necessary or sufficient for technological 
transmission: some of the most innovative industries in early modern Europe, particularly in 
the textile sector, were located in rural areas where producers were scattered across farms and 
small villages but nevertheless swiftly adopted – and even themselves invented – new wares 
and practices, often to a degree which urban guild practitioners found deeply annoying. Thus, 
for instance, the phenomenally successful molleton fabric – a woollen-linen mix – was 
invented in the Flemish village of Tourcoing in the early eighteenth century by an unguilded 
rural weaver, and by 1748 was being manufactured by at least 2,000 unguilded producers in 
that village alone, despite attempts by the Lille weavers’ guild first to monopolize the 
invention and, when this failed, to outlaw it altogether.
140 
  Such attempts by guilds to monopolize or outlaw new techniques are observed in 
most early modern European industries. In these cases guilds, far from using the trust they 
generated to solve imperfections in markets for innovations, abused their trust to oppose new 
techniques that threatened members’ rents. Enthusiasts for guilds are well aware of this 
evidence, and seek to dismiss it using four arguments. First, they point out that many 
industrial innovations in early modern Europe were adopted without being opposed by guilds. 
Second, they claim that guilds only opposed labour-saving and capital-intensive innovations, 
while favouring labour- and skill-intensive ones. Third, they contend that many innovations 
that were opposed by guilds were impractical and would never have been adopted anyway. 
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Finally, they argue that even when guilds did oppose innovations it did no harm since 
innovators simply evaded guild regulations.
141  
  It is certainly the case that some industrial innovations in early modern Europe were 
adopted without detectable guild resistance. If an innovation did not threaten established 
masters, their guild had no incentive to resist it. But the same guild could bitterly resist other 
innovations that its members did perceive as endangering their interests. The empirical record 
suggests that most guilds tolerated innovations that did not threaten their rents while blocking 
others they perceived as dangerously competitive.
142 What guilds provided was the means – 
the ‘social capital’ of mutual trust among guild members lowering the costs of collective 
action – which established producers could use to resist innovation when they saw it as a 
threat. The fact that they did not always use their social capital in this way does not mean that 
they did not do so on occasions when it suited their interests. 
  Acknowledging the existence of guild opposition to some innovative techniques, 
enthusiasts for guilds seek to belittle its economic impact by claiming that although guilds did 
oppose innovations that were labour-saving and capital-intensive, they favoured ones that 
were labour- and skill-intensive.
143 Empirically, however, this generalization does not hold. 
Thus, for instance, urban textile guilds often opposed the adoption of innovative new wares 
that were more skill-intensive than old ones, but threatened the interests of weaving masters 
by requiring the removal of guild ceilings on raw materials prices and employees’ wages, 
shifting power to merchants, or enabling some weavers to earn more than others.
144 Whether a 
guild opposed a particular innovation was doubtless influenced partly by its factor intensity, 
but only because that was one contributory factor to the more general issue of how that 
innovation affected members’ rents. This in turn depended on the specific regulations, 
institutional structure, and political economy of the local industry. It is also important to 
recognize that even if guilds had only opposed innovations that were labour-saving and 
capital-intensive, it does not follow that such opposition was harmless. Proponents of such 
innovations would not have been willing to invest in them had they not believed that they 
would increase productivity. Blocking such innovations therefore harmed the economy by 
reducing the amount of output it obtained from a given quantity of inputs.
145  
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  Another argument by which enthusiasts for guilds seek to belittle the economic 
impact of guild opposition to innovations is by claiming many new techniques were 
economically impractical.
146 But there is a problem with this. If a technique was no good and 
would not be adopted anyway, then why oppose it? The very fact that a guild mounted costly 
opposition to a technique suggests that guild masters regarded it as practical enough to harm 
them. If a technique was impractical, then the guild would have been safe to leave it 
unopposed. The best guess of modern economic historians must be that early modern guild 
members were rational and did not invest their resources in mounting opposition to a 
technique that had no practical implications for them. 
  The final line of defence is to acknowledge that guilds did try to block some practical 
innovations, but to claim that such attempts inevitably failed. Thus, it is pointed out, many 
innovations were secretly adopted after a while. Innovators sometimes forced guilds to 
liberalize by threatening to emigrate. Guilds in other regions might adopt the innovation 
anyway, and this put pressure on the original guild to relax its opposition.  
  But this line of argument – that institutional rules do not matter – has three major 
problems. First, the fact that regulations are evaded does not make them costless. Concealing 
forbidden innovations or migrating to a guildless enclave consumed resources which must 
have deterred the marginal innovator. Furthermore, as shown by analyses of the ‘informal’ 
sector in modern less developed economies, the costs of avoiding regulations often exert far-
reaching effects on the well-being of individuals and the performance of entire economies.
147 
  Second, it is a fallacy to believe that the existence of more liberal regimes and threats 
of emigration by individuals inevitably leads to the liberalization of inefficient institutions – 
as is clearly illustrated by the long survival of eastern European serfdom or the long 
stagnation of many modern developing economies. Political coalitions, trade protection, 
market segmentation, transportation costs, and migration restrictions enable many inefficient 
institutions to survive despite the existence of superior alternatives for generations, sometimes 
for centuries.
148 A pre-industrial guild could responded to outside competition either by 
relaxing its opposition to innovations or by mobilizing its social capital to fortify existing 
practices. The impact on guilds of competition from more liberal regimes was not inevitable, 
except perhaps in the very long term. Rather, it depended on the wider political and 
institutional framework. As discussed below in Section 4, in industries where guilds were able 
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to influence the political authorities, they could secure protection enabling them to sustain an 
inflexible position against competitors for generations or even centuries.
149  
  Finally, the argument that guild rules against technological innovations did not matter 
illustrates a theoretical incoherence at the heart of arguments that social capital and trust are 
always beneficial. On the one hand, guilds are supposed to have been too weak to abuse their 
trust in ways that harmed society, but on the other they are supposed to have been strong 
enough to use it in ways that benefited society. Guilds were simultaneously too weak to 
enforce regulations hindering innovation but strong enough to enforce regulations 
encouraging innovation. This position is untenable. One can defend guilds by arguing either 
that they were so weak they could not abuse their trust or that they were so strong they used 
their trust to benefit society – but not both at the same time. 
  Not only does the empirical record show that many guilds did deliberately seek to 
block new techniques, but it also suggests that many activities guilds undertook for other 
reasons exerted unintended but far-reaching effects on innovation. Guilds imposed quality 
regulations stipulating precisely how a product was supposed to be made, claiming that this 
was important for creating trust between producers and consumers. But such guild rules also 
deterred innovation by ossifying production methods and excluding even desirable deviations 
from them. Thus, for instance, guild quality regulations meant that the London pewterers’ 
products were ‘governed by tight specifications (and also by regulations prohibiting certain 
“short cut” manufacturing techniques that were held to be undesirable) and these constraints 
stifled any move towards competitive innovation’.
150 This ensured a desirable stream of rents 
for members of the London pewterers’ company, as shown by their willingness to lobby for 
the confirmation and extension of their regulatory powers into the eighteenth century. But in 
the longer term, the guilded London pewterers lost their markets to nimble, unguilded 
Sheffield competitors who devised innovative techniques to create the cheaper and more 
attractive Britannia metal: ‘The over-regulation and conservatism which had inhibited 
innovation and competition within the traditional pewterer’s craft had left most of the old-
style craftsmen unable to compete in the new industrial world. The company was bypassed 
...’.
151 
  Guilds also regulated the prices that producers could charge for wares, in order to 
foster trust among guild members by reducing inequality and preventing excessive 
competition. But such rules also deterred innovators by denying them the profits they might 
hope for if, by using an innovative technique, they could undersell competitors.
152 Guilds 
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imposed admission restrictions so as to create trust between masters and trainees over training 
contracts, and between producers and customers over craft skills. But such guild rules also 
deterred innovation by compelling a limited number of practitioners to spend many years in 
apprenticeship and journeymanship and endowing masters with a heavy investment in human 
capital specific to a particular technique and set of products; this gave guild-trained producers 
strong incentives to resist any technical change that threatened to depreciate that investment. 
Guilds imposed demarcations between different crafts in order to create trust between 
producers and consumers over product characteristics and practitioners’ skills.
153 But such 
guild rules also deterred innovation by preventing the productive exchange of ideas between 
adjacent bodies of knowledge. In short, rules imposed by guilds to enhance trust in one sphere 
of activity could have the effect of diminishing trust in another – in this case, to reduce 
innovators’ trust that markets would reward them for inventing, adopting, or disseminating 
new techniques. 
  A final reason to question the argument that guild-fostered trust made markets for 
innovation work better is provided by European comparisons. Not only were many strongly 
guilded industries technologically backward and stagnant, but many weakly guilded industries 
were highly innovative. Thus, for instance, the city of Douai in the Southern Netherlands is 
well-known for lacking guild organizations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but 
precisely this allowed ‘small producers and merchants to try out new raw materials, explore 
new ways to acquire them, develop different production techniques, and widen their 
distribution networks’.
154 The Dutch city of Leiden was legendary for restricting or altogether 
banning textile guilds from the later sixteenth century on, yet its flourishing textile sector was 
in the forefront of technological innovation, introducing hundreds of new varieties of wares 
and numerous innovative mechanical devices, and remaining one of the most successful and 
innovative European textile centres until overtaken by cheaper Flemish and English 
competitors in the later seventeenth century.
155 The Bruges linen-weavers introduced the 
technically advanced striped and checked Zingas with wild success in the eighteenth century 
by circumventing and ultimately abolishing guild restrictions on workshop size and labour 
practices.
156 The West Riding of Yorkshire was as close as possible to being wholly 
unguilded, yet its woollen and worsted industries were the most successful in eighteenth-
century Europe, partly because of their exceptional receptiveness to technological innovations 
in both process and product.
 157 The weavers, finishers, and merchants of Douai, Leiden, 
Bruges, or the West Riding devised and adopted new techniques in the belief – which was 
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evidently justified – that markets functioned efficiently enough to reward them for doing so. 
This is not to say that alternative institutional arrangements governing technological 
innovations – a more efficient patent system, for instance – would not have made these 
markets work even better. But it is clear that guilds were not the solution. On the contrary: 
unguilded or weakly guilded industries were more often than not at the forefront of inventing, 
adopting, and diffusing new techniques in early modern Europe.  
 
4. Guilds and the Abuse of Trust 
 
In such crucial economic spheres as product quality, human capital investment, and 
technological innovation, a particularized trust in guild members linked to a differential trust 
in guild institutions appears to have been less favourable to economic growth than a 
generalized trust in strangers linked to a uniform trust in impartial states and markets. Counter 
to the claims of social capital theorists, the particularized and differential trust generated by 
associative institutions does not seem to have fostered the generalized and uniform trust that 
makes markets and states work better.
158 One might, rather, advance the alternative hypothesis 
that particularized and differential trust blocked the growth of generalized and uniform trust. 
Early modern European economies either retained powerful guilds, or developed impersonal 
markets open to all participants irrespective of group affiliation where transactions were 
enforced by impartial state institutions; but they do not seem to have had both simultaneously. 
  Why was this so? This is just what historians would like to know. The evidence 
discussed above suggests that we look more closely at the neglected ‘dark side’ of social 
capital.
159 Once a guild or other social network succeeds in generating ‘particularized’ trust in 
its members and ‘differential’ trust in itself as an institution, it has incentives to abuse this 
trust by acting collusively to benefit its members at the expense of outsiders and the wider 
society. The evidence examined here suggests that such abuse of trust is not an incidental 
manifestation of the occasional ‘bad’ social network. Rather, it appears to be implied by the 
very characteristics that enable any social network to generate social capital to begin with. 
  As already discussed, social capital takes four main forms: the fostering of shared 
norms; the improvement of information flows about these norms; the punishment of 
violations against these norms; and the organization of collective action in defence of these 
norms. Early modern guilds manifested all four, and each involved generating a 
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‘particularized’ trust in guild members linked to a ‘differential’ trust in the guild as an 
institution. But the norms, information, penalties, and collective action fostered by guilds also 
gave them the incentive and capacity to abuse the trust they generated to benefit their 
members at others’ expense. 
  Guilds created trust among their members enabling them to coordinate on shared 
norms.
160 Enthusiasts for guilds have concentrated on what they regard as beneficial norms: 
that masters should produce high-quality output, that all producers should secure skilled 
training, that technological ‘mysteries’ should be nurtured. But there is nothing guaranteeing 
that a guild – or any other social network – will use its trust to ensure that members 
coordinate on norms that are beneficial rather than harmful from the point of view of society 
as a whole. Early modern guilds also coordinated on other, more questionable norms: that 
non-members should not practise certain economic activities, that many kinds of people 
should be excluded from guild membership, that girls should not receive vocational training, 
that it was dishonourable to outbid one’s fellows in paying employees, that guild members 
should shun Jews, knackers, and bastards.  
  But were these norms beneficial? The norm that it was wrong to practise an 
occupation without guild membership served to exclude many producers regardless of how 
well they could actually do the work. The norm that girls should be denied apprenticeship and 
women other than masters’ widows forbidden to operate workshops protected male guild 
members from competition and forced many women into marginal, ill-paid, and illegal 
work.
161 The norm that it was ‘dishonourable’ to pay employees a competitive wage caused 
hardship to thousands of apprentices, journeymen, spinners, and craft labourers, and is likely 
to have resulted in inefficient resource allocation.
162 The norm that intercourse with Jews and 
knackers was ‘defiling’ was economically inefficient and socially divisive.
163 As the 
pioneering social capital theorist James Coleman himself acknowledged, ‘effective norms in 
an area can reduce innovativeness in an area, not only deviant actions that harm others but 
also deviant actions that can benefit everyone’.
164 Trust among guild members in early 
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modern Europe penalized ‘deviant’ actions – occupational mobility, independent work by 
women, competitive wages for the poorest workers, non-monopolistic commerce, and moves 
to break down gender and racial discrimination – that could have benefited everyone, except 
possibly a small group of established male guild masters (and in the long term even they 
might have done better had they been able to coordinate on deviating from corporative 
norms).
165 
  The second way guilds used trust was to improve the flow of information among 
members. They did so by employing inspectors and spies to report offences against guild 
norms and by holding assemblies at which members were required to report any information 
that affected guild interests. Guild activities were often closely integrated into communal 
assembles and court sittings, so that violations of guild norms swiftly became known to the 
wider community.
166 These information-transmission mechanisms indeed ensured that guild 
members were aware of each other’s personal characteristics and actions, and that such 
information was also conveyed into the wider economic world of their suppliers, employees, 
and customers. Enthusiasts for guilds have focussed on the benefits of this social capital of 
mutual information: it enabled customers to trust producers on product quality, masters to 
trust employees on human capital investment, and all guild members to trust that 
technological innovations would profit the membership. But this social capital of mutual 
information was also used for harmful ends. The activities of guild inspectors, the obligation 
to report known offences at guild assemblies, and the integration of guild with communal, 
manorial, and princely regulatory mechanisms enabled guilds to exclude non-members from 
economic activity, enforce output quotas, prevent adoption of new techniques, limit 
apprenticeship by outsiders, and penalize black-market work by women – to abuse their 
particularized trust of shared information in order stifle ‘innovations’ that could, in Coleman’s 
formulation, have benefited everyone.
167 
  The third way guilds used trust was to facilitate group action against violations of 
their norms. Guilds were entitled to punish a wide range of offences relating not only to the 
economic activities over which they claimed control but also to the social, sexual, and cultural 
behaviour of their members.
168 Again, enthusiasts have focussed on those manifestations of 
group action that can be regarded as beneficial: collective sanctions against violations of 
quality codes, against economic activity by untrained producers, against adopting capital-
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intensive technological innovations that threatened to put other members out of business. But 
was this social capital of collective sanctions always beneficial? Collective sanctions were 
also used to sustain guild members’ monopoly over the occupation, to help masters collude to 
pay non-competitive wages to employees, to enforce cartelistic output quotas which kept 
prices high for customers, to penalize employers who failed to discriminate against female 
workers, to put pressure on outsiders to become members of the guild, and to sanction those 
who associated with ‘defiling’ social groups.
169 In the light of such evidence, one must surely 
question whether guilds’ use of trust to impose collective sanctions was truly beneficial to the 
wider economy and society.
170 
  The fourth way guilds used their social capital of trust was to organize collective 
political action – in Robert Putnam’s formulation, to ‘monitor’ the actions of government.
171 
It is evident from surviving petitions, town council minutes, and princely deliberations that 
early modern European guilds were active in monitoring – indeed, lobbying – all levels of 
government to ensure that ‘appropriate’ political, legislative, and executive decisions were 
taken.
172 Guild members invested substantial quantities of time and money in petitioning, 
lobbying, and demonstrating so as to put pressure on the political process in order to ensure 
that policies reflected their interests.
173 Enthusiasts for guilds and social capital have 
concentrated on what they regard as the beneficial aspects of this collective political action – 
in particular, the ability of guilds to monitor government and hold it to account in a quasi-
‘democratic’ sense that benefited the entire society, guild members and non-members alike. It 
was this political activity by guilds, according to Robert Putnam, that underlay the beneficent 
development of guilded Northern Italy compared to the politically and socially dysfunctional 
Italian South.
 174 
  But did it truly benefit either the early modern state or the early modern economy for 
guilds to use their trust to organize political action? Well organized corporate groups such as 
guilds were in a position to offer fiscal support and political cooperation to rulers in tacit 
exchange for legislation and legal privileges that favoured their members.
175 Such political 
favours may have seemed harmless to rulers, or even – if guild rhetoric was to be credited – 
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positively beneficial for the wider society. Such favours also had the great advantage of 
costing the ruler nothing, at least in the short term. But by limiting economic activity in 
favour of a producer group in return for a lump-sum payment (or other political benefit) now, 
a government denies itself the benefits of higher tax revenues through economic growth in 
future.
176 Furthermore, when guilds deployed their social capital of particularized and 
differential trust to lobby governments for market privileges, they may have hindered the 
spread of generalized trust in strangers and uniform trust in an institutional framework of 
unrigged markets and impartial state contract enforcement.
177 In short, the particularized and 
differential trust associated with social capital may have been an obstacle to the development 
of the generalized and uniform trust necessary for markets and states to work effectively in 
ways equally accessible to all economic agents, irrespective of the social networks to which 
they belonged.
178 The benefits of particularized and differential trust – such as they were –
may thus have been secured at a high cost in terms of foregone generalized and uniform trust. 
 
5. Conclusion: Can We Trust ‘Trust’? 
 
The social capital literature is almost unanimous in holding that modern societies are under-
supplied with trust and social capital, and that historical social networks hold important policy 
lessons. This article has sought to identify the salient features of social capital and the type of 
trust it generates by examining the most widely admired historical example of social capital – 
the guild. Several general principles emerge from this historical inquiry, but the light they cast 
on social capital is not encouraging.  
  Historical networks such as guilds confirm Coleman’s view that those social 
arrangements likely to generate significant trust will be characterized by ‘closure’ and 
‘multiplex relationships’.
179 Early modern European guilds carefully regulated membership 
according to sex, ethnicity, religion, community citizenship, kinship with existing members, 
and ability to pay license fees. Guilds were not wholly closed to new members, but they 
limited entrants’ quantity and selected their qualities: many members of the wider society had 
a high probability (or, if female, certainty) of never being admitted to membership in these 
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social networks and thus never enjoying the benefits of the trust they generated. Early modern 
guilds also fostered multiplex relationships: their members were linked not just through 
economic norms, information, sanctions and collective action, but through multi-stranded ties 
extending into work, play, sociability, worship, politics, charity, and kinship. The evidence on 
early modern guilds thus confirms that effective social networks are characterized by 
relationships that are closed toward the outside and multi-stranded on the inside. 
  The findings on guilds also confirms that trust takes a number of distinct forms, some 
of which seem to block the development of others. Associative institutions such as guilds 
foster a particularized trust in persons of known attributes and, as in parts of early modern 
Europe, this can hinder the spread of the generalized trust in strangers which social scientists 
regard as extremely important for societies and economies to function well. Privileged, guild-
like networks also foster a differential trust in institutions that enforce the rights of certain 
groups, and this can block the development of a uniform trust in impartial institutions that are 
open to all – even those without network-specific privileges.
180 
  Certain forms of trust are more favourable to economic growth than others. It is 
sometimes argued that the particularized and differential trust generated by guilds was used to 
solve imperfections in markets for product quality, human capital investment, and 
technological innovation in early modern Europe. But the evidence surveyed in this essay 
suggests that they often failed to do so. The very closure and multiplex relationships that 
enabled guilds to foster trust created incentives that prevented them from using that trust in 
ways that benefited the wider economy as opposed to profiting their own membership. 
The closure that creates trust means that many network activities are open to abuse. 
Closure caused guilds to sustain norms privileging a status quo that benefited insiders and 
discriminated against outsiders. Guilds punished beneficial as well as harmful deviations from 
their norms and suppressed innovations that could have benefited the wider society. Shared 
information (e.g. on technology or training) was conveyed to trusted insiders but denied to 
outsiders. Network membership became a trusted signal ensuring the long-term exclusion of 
productive economic agents, sustaining discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnicity, 
religion, legitimate birth, and many other economically irrelevant grounds. Collective 
political action enabled guilds to engage in rent-seeking and distort markets, harming 
outsiders and the wider society. The very features that enable social networks such as guilds 
to generate trust also enable them to act collusively against the common weal.
181 
  The final lesson from guild history is at once the most important and most 
disquieting, especially for modern transitional and developing economies. Even a social 
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network that generates benefits in a given state of technology, costs and incomes, may cease 
to do so when constraints change. Precisely the trust and commitment devices that generate 
social capital may also foster conservatism. Thus the guild-dominated societies of northern 
Italy and southern Germany were unable to adjust to the rapid institutional, commercial and 
demographic changes of the sixteenth century and lost out to the market-oriented civic culture 
of the Low Countries and England. While the strong Italian and German guilds possessed 
enough social capital to entrench themselves against change, the looser and weaker Flemish 
and English guilds lacked the social capital to put up a fight. The absence of the particularized 
and differential trust generated by associative institutions such as guilds created interstices 
within which individuals and rulers could experiment with generalized trust in unknown 
transaction partners mediated by impersonal markets and impartial states. This cannot be 
regarded as an accident. To foster trust, social networks need to have closure, information 
advantages, collective penalties, and commitment devices; once these are in place, it is hard to 
prevent them from being abused to resist changes that threaten existing benefits.  
  Even in early modern Europe, where constraints changed so much more slowly than 
today, the particularized trust and entrenched privileges of social networks could prove a 
long-term economic obstacle. Nowadays, constraints change immeasurably faster. In such a 
world, one must question whether poor economies can afford the inflexibility of entrenched 
social networks that foster a particularized trust in persons and a differential trust in 
associations rather than a generalized trust in strangers and a uniform trust in impersonal 
markets and impartial governments. As Partha Dasgupta has trenchantly observed, informal 
institutions based on social capital may bring certain benefits in less developed economies, 
but one should not be ‘distracted from asking if their continued existence could prevent more 
productive social arrangements from becoming established, say, in the shape of formal 
markets. One can even ask whether informal institutions were ever as good as they are 
frequently made out to have been.’
182 It is precisely the strength of social networks – their 
favouring of trust in a particular set of people over outsiders and their fostering of internal 
commitment devices – that may be their greatest weakness, not merely for outsiders (although 
these are often the poorest in society), but also for the economy at large. For the particularized 
and differential trust fostered by social capital, the lessons of history are bleak. 
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